Economists have long studied the relationship between the real and monetary sectors. We trace out the effects of an exogenous real shock, the 1906 San Francisco earthquake. The quake's impact manifested itself in international gold flows, as British insurance companies paid their San Francisco claims out of home funds in the fall of 1906. The capital outflow threatened the fixed sterling-dollar exchange rate, leading the Bank of England to raise interest rates and discriminate against American finance bills. The resulting contraction pushed the United States into recession, setting the stage for the 1907 Panic and the founding of the Fed.
Economics has a large theoretical literature that explains the interaction between the real and monetary sectors of an economy. Empirical evidence on the money-output and output-money relationship is less clear, however. The endogeneity problem between the two sectors makes it difficult to identify the effects of shocks in vector autoregressions (VARs) and calibration exercises. England to undertake defensive measures to maintain a fixed sterling/dollar exchange rate. The central bank responded by raising its discount rate two hundred-fifty basis points between September and November 1906 and by pressuring British joint-stock companies to stop discounting American finance bills for the next year. (Economist, October 20, 1906 , p. 1694 .
Actions by the Bank of England attracted gold imports and sharply reduced the flow of gold to the United States. By May 1907, the United States had fallen into one of the shortest, but most severe recessions in American history (Friedman and Schwartz, [1963] ). Thus primed for a financial crisis, already-weakened world markets crashed in October 1907 with the collapse of the Knickerbocker Trust Company in New York. Ultimately, the Panic of 1907 led to one of the most important institutional changes in American history: the creation of the Federal Reserve System designed to provide for an elastic currency and to act as a lender-of-last resort.
II. Background
The Panic of 1907 was a watershed event for the United States. This was the last in a series of financial crises during the National Banking Era that prompted reform of the American financial system. is not surprising that this event has been the subject of much investigation. Figure II , the United States imported over $50 million in the spring and approximately $80 million in the late summer and early fall. Sprague attributes the first wave of gold imports to a cyclical boom in 1905 that placed extraordinary credit demands on New York banks and the stock market, whereas he believes excessive speculation in the New York stock market explains the second wave of gold imports. The U. S. Treasury, led by Andrew Shaw, subsidized these gold flows by offering to temporarily place public deposits in banks if they imported gold from abroad. The policy lowered the gold import point by offsetting the interest lost while gold was in transit. Goodhart [1969] , however, notes that the gold import point was often low enough to have justified specie inflows without the subsidy.
In the fixed exchange rate world of 1906, such large gold outflows were a significant threat to a country's ability to maintain the par value of its currency which, for the pound sterling, was $4.867.
Faced with its lowest ratio of reserves to deposits since the 1893 crisis, the Bank of England nearly doubled its discount rate, from 3 ½ percent on September 12 to 6 percent on October 19. As shown in Figure III City banks, and J. P. Morgan formed a money pool with bankers to provide liquidity assistance to trust companies and the stock market (Donaldson, [1993] ; Ramirez, [1995] ; DeLong, [1997] ). These measures eased conditions in the money market, but failed to prevent the suspension of specie payments (Moen and Tallman, [2000] ).
As short-term interest rates rose to over 10 percent, gold poured into the United States from
England and the rest of Europe. Figure II shows that the United States imported over $100 million in gold during November and December. Although the specie arrived too late to prevent a panic, gold shipments probably shortened the period of suspension and reduced the duration of the recession. On the other hand, specie exports drained European money centers of gold, helping to transmit the "localized" New York panic to international financial markets (Goodhart, [1969] ).
Previous research has focused on the role of "excessive speculation" and on the policies of the U.S. Treasury and the Bank of England in propagating the Panic of 1907. These studies, however, have overlooked the role of the San Francisco earthquake in the financial crisis. In this paper, we utilize data from contemporary newspapers as well as internal documents from British insurance companies to examine the effects of the quake on American and world financial markets. 6 The payment of claims by
British insurance companies to policyholders in San Francisco holds the key to understanding the shock that prompted defensive actions by the Bank of England and the chain of events that culminated in the Panic of 1907.
III. The Setting
By the time the transcontinental railroad was completed in 1869, San Francisco had already established itself as the center for export trade from the Pacific Coast region. Endowed with an excellent natural harbor and easy coastal and river access to the agricultural and natural resource riches of the west, San Francisco had developed strong economic ties to other countries, particularly to
Britain. Most of the wheat exported from the west coast and bound for England was financed through
San Francisco, and a sizeable number of London banks had offices in that city.
At the same time, other British financial institutions sought to expand their business in the area.
Prominent among these were the British fire insurance companies. In 1852, the Liverpool & London & Globe fire insurance company placed an agent in San Francisco --the first such insurance firm (either foreign or domestic) in the city. Two years later, three more British firms were writing business in San
Francisco and the first American company set up shop, but it wasn't until 1858 that a San Franciscobased company was established (Kirschner, [1922] Twenty-five years later, these patterns persisted. At the end of 1905, slightly more than half of insured risks were underwritten by American firms, with almost forty percent of business still carried by foreign firms, most of whom were based in Britain. On the other hand, California-based firms were writing only seven percent of fire insurance business in the state (Kirschner, [1922] ). The city of San
Francisco was even more dependent on foreign fire insurers than the state as a whole. By the turn of the century, it was estimated that at least half of all fire insurance policies in San Francisco had been issued by British companies (Cockerell and Green, [1976] ). One explanation for the dominance of British firms is the long history of trade relations between the city and Britain; another is simple economics: as agents from the London and Lancashire insurance firm noted, the profit on San Francisco business equaled thirty percent -"three times greater than that yielded by its business generally" (Kirschner, [1922] ). Evidently, adjusters failed to consider earthquake risk.
IV. The Disaster
On Wednesday, April 18, 1906, an earthquake of Richter magnitude 8.3 hit San Francisco.
Most of the damage was not done by the tremor itself (which was especially severe in areas of landfill where liquefaction occurred) but by the fires that followed. The majority of the city's buildings had been made of wood; this material was far more plentiful and inexpensive than brick, thanks to the city's central place in the coastal lumber trade. The combination of close quarters, highly flammable building materials, and earthquake-damaged water mains hampered the efforts of firefighters. Ultimately more than four square miles --about half of the city --were destroyed. Although fewer than 1,500 of the city's 375,000 residents were killed, damage was estimated at between $350 million and $500 million (Commercial and Financial Chronicle, October 19, 1907) .
Word of the disaster in San Francisco spread throughout the United States within hours.
Prominent financiers, members of Congress, and foreign delegations all promised aid to the stricken city, but private and government relief were minimal (Haas, [1977] Of course, the magnitude of policies did not reflect the size of insurance payments to be made; some properties survived the earthquake undamaged. At the same time, the insurers (in a particularly bad public relations move) indicated early on that no payments would be made on damage that resulted from the earthquake itself. This was a sticky point: If the fires that followed the earthquake caused the damage but the fires themselves were caused by the earthquake, insurers claimed that they were not liable. There were no clear means of allocating damage to the earthquake and to the fire, although some insurers proposed a 60-40 split: Forty percent of each policy claim would be denied "on the ground that the destroyed buildings were first damaged in that proportion by the temblor" (Los Angeles Times,
May 8, 1906).
On the other hand, some company directors claimed that they were, in fact, forbidden to pay out such claims:
Under any circumstances, the British insurance offices will pay only losses for which they are legally liable, since to go beyond their contracts would be illegal. They cannot recognize any liability for damage by earthquake where no fire ensured nor for any damage by fire to fallen or partly fallen buildings, nor for any damages to buildings pulled down or destroyed by order of the San Francisco authorities. (Los Angeles Times, May 4, 1906) Reaction to these statements was met with published outrage: In one San Francisco newspaper, the editor's sarcasm was unrestrained:
To say that [insurers] will not recognize as an obligation the destruction of a building by fire, which fire was the result of an earthquake, is to take a position hardly more reputable than that of an ordinary pickpocket. 
V. The Cost
The short-run impact of the earthquake on financial conditions in general --and interest rates in particular --was, perversely, rather small. Certainly, the sell-off of stocks by insurance companies (and some panicked investors) resulted in a significant drop in the price of shares 8 , but there was little credit stringency in early spring. As the New York Times reported at the beginning of May, whereas a few weeks ago bankers were looking forward with extreme misgivings to the Autumn, owing to the limitations of the money market, they believe now, or at least a good many of them do, that money is likely to be easier, and that the ease will be more prolonged than could possibly have been the case without the San Francisco disaster and the enormous liquidation of securities which it precipitated. (New York Times, May 3, 1906) In essence, the earthquake had the effect of softening credit markets in the first two or three months after the disaster. As shown in Figure V , interest rates on 60-day commercial paper for both the United States and England moved very little in the weeks following the earthquake. Potential borrowers and stock speculators in the rest of the country were taking a wait-and-see attitude toward the disaster and its possible impact on economic activity. At the same time, insurance companies were liquidating stocks in anticipation of making payments to San Francisco.
Funds for relief and rebuilding flowed into the city quite quickly. As shown in Figure II What made this all the more significant for international financial markets was the fact that most foreign insurers decided to pay claims out of "home funds" rather than reserves in the United
States. 9 The rationale for this decision was apparently based on transactions costs and thickness of markets:
Considering that their outstanding liabilities in America have been largely curtailed by the San Francisco conflagration, it might have been thought the companies would utilise some portion of their funds there for the purpose of meeting the claims upon them. It was probably decided, however, that, in view of the magnitude of these claims, the amount that could be so obtained would be, comparatively speaking, so small that it would not be worth while going through the formalities requisite to obtain the release of the funds which are held by trustees for the company and for the American policyholders. (Economist, August 11, 1906) At home, the British companies were also hesitant to liquidate the securities in which they held reserves.
Given the size of losses involved, such sales would undoubtedly depress stock prices. As a consequence, a number of firms negotiated term loans with their banks and so postponed securities sales for a few months (see Financial Times, July 6, 1906 In sum, then, the San Francisco earthquake gave rise to a massive outflow of funds --of gold --from London, both immediately after the earthquake and again in the autumn of 1906. As shown in Figure The magnitude of the British funds flows can be put into stark perspective by noting that they represented a 14 percent loss in the gold money stock of England, exerting enormous pressure on the fixed sterling-dollar exchange rate. 14 Faced with its largest two-month net gold outflow of the entire period from 1900 to 1913 - Figure VIII , 15 the Bank of England nearly doubled the discount rate from 3½ percent to 6 percent between September and October. 16 As noted earlier, this was accompanied by a discriminatory policy towards American finance bills for the next year. This policy reversed 
VI. Conclusion
Economists have developed a number of theories to explain how real shocks affect the financial and monetary sectors of an economy. Empirical evidence on the links between real and monetary shocks, however, is often difficult to uncover given the endogenous interaction of the two factors. The
San Francisco earthquake, on the other hand, is an identifiable exogenous real shock with a traceable impact. We follow the impact of this disaster and its effects on the American economy and world financial markets. We show how the payment of insurance claims resulting from the disaster prompted changes in money and financial markets worldwide; the Bank of England raised interest rates and discriminated against American finance bills for the next year. These actions helped push the U.S. 12.00 7-Jan-05 7-Mar-05 7-May-05 7-Jul-05 7-Sep-05 7-Nov-05 7-Jan-06 7-Mar-06 7-May-06 7-Jul-06 7-Sep-06 7-Nov-06 7-Jan-07 7-Mar-07 7-May-07 7-Jul-07 7-Sep-07 7-Nov-07 7-Jan-08 7-Mar-08 7-May-08 7-Jul-08 7-Sep-08 7-Nov-08 
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